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Typical arguments against scientific misconduct generally fail to support current policies 
on  research  fraud:  they  may  not  prove  wrong  what  is  usually  considered  research 
misconduct and they tend to make wrong things that are not normally seen as scientific 
fraud, in particular honest errors. I also point out that sanctions are not consistent with 
the  reasons why scientific  fraud is  supposed to be  wrong either.  Moreover  honestly 
seeking  truth  should  not  be  contrived  as  a  moral  rule — it  is  instead  a  necessary 
condition for work to qualify as scientific. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: FRAUD, FROM SCIENCE TO BUREAUCRACY 
Both  philosophers  (Hofmann,  2007;  Kaposy,  2008;  Schmaus,  1983,  1984)  and  sociologists 
(Merton, 1942; Wunderlich, 1974; Zuckerman, 1977, 1984) have asked, in their different ways, what 
is acceptable scientific behavior. Punishment is not their main concern (even though it may follow 
from other considerations). On the other hand, scientists, politicians, and lawyers have focused on 
sanctions for misconduct.1 There is little interaction between the two: David Guston (1999) found 
that  the  changing  public  policies  of  the  past  few  decades  corresponded  to  equally  changing 
underlying conceptions of scientific norms. But policy makers did not always notice that a different 
policy  likely  means  a  different  construal  of  scientific  fraud;  in  fact  certain  policies  may  not 
correspond to any coherent theory at all.  Policies are essentially  ad hoc:  inclusion or exclusion of 
certain deeds as scientific misconduct does not come from a careful and consistent argumentation. 
To  James  Dooley  and  Helen  Kerch  (2000),  “scientific  misconduct  includes  fabrication, 
falsification, and plagiarism (FFP) of concepts, data or ideas; some institutions in the United States 
have  expanded  this  concept  to  include  ‘other  serious  deviations  (OSD)  from  accepted  research 
practice’ ” (emphasis added). ‘Misconduct’ simply means bad behavior, which is quite general. It thus 
1 This trend was triggered by a number of scandals at the end of the last century, which were supposedly 
indicative of a failure of the self-regulation of science. (Of course, this brand new problem was old news sixty 
years ago: “violations of professional ethics on the part of scientists are frequent and familiar to all scientists” 
(Pigman and Carmichael, 1950).) But saying that such scandals show a failure of researchers to fight fraud is 
like saying that the police seizing a ton of cocaine is proof of its failure to fight drug trafficking. The fact that 
fraud is found out is not proof that science is not (or no longer) self-regulating: fraud being found out is self-
regulation.
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seems that scientific misconduct should be anything that is wrong, not just fabrication, falsification, 
and plagiarism. In other words, it is the limitation of misconduct to three kinds of acts that requires 
justification.2 But whether to include “other serious deviations” is not seen as making a decision 
regarding what is wrong but rather as a matter of what would make for a more enforceable rule. 
Dooley and Kerch indeed note that “CRI [the U.S. Commission on Research Integrity] endorsed 
what it claimed to be a more legally enforceable definition of scientific misconduct” and “more in 
line with the nation’s legal system than with the practice of science.” Jesse Goldner (1998) notes that 
“the general trend over the past decade has been away from a primarily scientist-run process toward 
one in  which lawyers  have played an increasingly  crucial  role.”  In fact,  most of  the literature is 
dedicated  to  the  history  of  the  bureaucracy  and  of  the  judicial  processes  related  to  research 
misconduct (e.g. Dooley and Kerch,  2000;  Goldner, 1998;  LaFollette, 1994;  Mishkin, 1999;  Pascal, 
1999; Price, 1994) rather than to questions of what is wrong and why — the focus is on procedures 
(due process, whistle-blower protection) and sanctions. (These are not intrinsically legal issues, they 
have been made so in the U.S. in part because about anything there ends up decided by a tribunal.) 
There has been little effort to justify prosecuting certain deeds rather than others (many articles offer 
no justification  at  all).  However,  one cannot  choose  a  practical  definition  of  fraud (i.e. a  list  of 
banned practices) independently of why fraud is supposed to be wrong. The underlying problem is 
that when one takes something to be obviously wrong one tends not to scrutinize one’s arguments 
too  closely  (Bouville, 2008a).  The  cartoon  recently  published  by  Nature (vol.  453,  pp.  980–981) 
seemed targeted towards elementary school children rather than scholars: falsification is not nice and 
you must tell a grown-up if you see someone do it. The present article, on the other hand, aims at a 
grown readership. 
Research fraud is often presented as a waste of public money, and “surely the public has a right to 
presume that its tax money is being spent wisely” (Redman and Caplan, 2005).  (There is a more 
general trend making funding central, e.g. to retention and promotion — rather than funding being a 
means to do science, it seems that science is turning into a means to secure funding.) One should 
note  that  a  government cannot  fire  researchers  (other  than those  it  directly  employs),  it  cannot 
prevent anyone from writing in journals or from attending conferences; the only thing it can do is 
cut funds. The reason why fraud is punished by funding debarment is not that those who sinned by 
misuse of funds shall perish by funding deprivation, but simply because this is about the only way a 
government  can concretely  punish researchers — short  of  making research misconduct  a  crime, 
which only a few (e.g. Redman and Caplan,  2005; Sovacool, 2005) would endorse. Waste of public 
money is not a serious argument against scientific fraud (as I shall show in greater detail in the next 
section)  but  rather  a  rationalization,  a  way  of  justifying  the  power  of  investigation  of  funding 
agencies. The idea that research misconduct shall be an administrative and legalistic issue precedes 
the question of why it is wrong. 
2 The phrases ‘research fraud’, ‘research misconduct’, ‘scientific fraud’ and ‘scientific misconduct’ tend to 
be  used  rather  interchangeably,  even  though  ‘misconduct’  is  a  priori  broader  than  ‘fraud.’ ‘Misconduct’ 
nonetheless seems favored —a search for ‘scientific misconduct’ turned ten times as many papers as ‘scientific 
fraud’—, possibly  because it  is  vaguer and thus looks more innocuous (concealing the irritating fact  that 
‘scientific fraud’ is not an oxymoron). But whether to distinguish between the two or not cannot be a purely 
semantic issue: it involves a choice as to what should be prosecuted and what should not, i.e. I would get 
ahead of myself if I made such a decision now. For this reason I will use these four phrases interchangeably. I 
will also treat ‘researcher’ and ‘scientist’ as synonyms.
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II. WHICH PRACTICES ARE WRONG AND WHY? 
A. Why is scientific fraud wrong? 
The simplest argument against fraud is that it can “directly and negatively impact the integrity of 
the  research  record”  (Dooley  and  Kerch, 2000),  i.e. “of  what  is  presented  as  scientific  facts” 
(Forsman, 1999). Research is supposed to create new knowledge, so what is published must be true: 
scientific  journals  are  not  supposed  to  publish  fiction.  Another  issue  is  that  scientific  fraud  is 
incompatible with the necessary “moral integrity of scientists” (Merton, 1942), and more specifically 
with  “the  institutional  goal  of  extending  certified  knowledge”  (Zuckerman, 1984).  Scientists  are 
supposed to honestly seek truth and to aim at creating new knowledge. Claude Bernard (1865) even 
talks of “the cult owed to the truth” (“le culte dû à la vérité”) and Charles Babbage (1830) writes: “I 
feel that I shall deserve the thanks of all who really value truth, by stating some of the methods of 
deceiving  practised by unworthy claimants for its  honours.”  It  is  often mentioned that scientific 
misconduct can harm the population; for instance, a fraudulent report that a given medicine has no 
side effect may expose those taking it to unexpected harm. A last point is that fraud allows some to 
receive more than they deserve (e.g. promotion or awards) by increasing the number or the impact of 
their publications. I will scrutinize these five arguments of scientific record, honesty, waste of funds, 
harm to the population, and undeserved rewards to determine exactly what kinds of deeds they can 
show to be wrong and to find out whether they have undesirable consequences (e.g. making too 
many things wrong). 
B. Incriminated practices 
The three big players of research fraud are fabrication, falsification and plagiarism. The first two 
are similar in that they correspond to the publication of results that intentionally misrepresent reality. 
About  all  criteria  for  the  wrongness  of  research  misconduct  conclude  that  fabrication  and 
falsification are wrong. However, it is not obvious that they waste funding: someone who fails to 
obtain interesting results and falsifies data to boost their value does not waste any more funds than 
someone  who  fails  to  obtain  interesting  results  and  decides  not  to  publish  anything.  It  is  not 
fabrication and falsification that waste money, but rather the unsuccessful research that led to them. 
If  they waste money,  it  can only  be indirectly:  others  will  unsuccessfully  try to build upon fake 
results, thus wasting funds. But this applies mostly to the higher-profile cases: few papers attract 
enough attention to have such negative consequences. Whether fabrication and falsification waste 
money can only be decided case by case.3 
Plagiarism means passing off someone else’s work as one’s own. Plagiarism affects our knowledge 
of who did what rather than our knowledge of the world (the subject matter of science), making it 
less  incompatible  with  scientific  standards  than  the  publication  of  inaccurate  results:  “the 
3 Among the prosecuted cases of fabrication or falsification, those that wasted money are overrepresented 
because it is generally this unfruitful attempt at repeating the experiments that created suspicion. In other 
words, fabricated and falsified results that waste money are prosecuted more often than others because they 
are more visible, not because they are more wrong. Even though this correlation between prosecution and 
waste of money is accidental,  it is not problematic if  waste of funding is the reason why fabrication and 
falsification are wrong. Otherwise one should prosecute all fraud (even if it  leads to no wasteful work by 
others) — current practices are at odds with arguments other than that of waste of funds. Another situation 
where the probability of prosecution may not be related to wrongness is popular work — a report for Science  
magazine “urges  us to  give special  attention  to a  relatively  small number  of  papers  that  are likely  to  be 
especially visible or influential” (Kennedy, 2006). One would be more likely to be prosecuted if one’s work is 
more visible even though visibility plainly has nothing to do with wrongness (and, unlike in the previous case, 
this would be intentional).
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introduction of fraudulent evidence is more seriously at odds with the institutional goal of extending 
certified knowledge than is the publication of plagiarized but reliable evidence” (Zuckerman, 1984). 
In fact plagiarism can even help to spread valid information by multiplying sources. Plagiarism does 
not use any money: plagiarism is the absence of work, it takes no time and no resource (it is precisely 
this absence of work that makes it wrong). So a fortiori  plagiarism does not waste any public funds. 
Plagiarism does not harm the population at large since the results are correct. The main impact of 
plagiarism is that plagiarists will be overestimated because their publication list is unduly impressive, 
which skews promotion and award procedures.4 (One should nonetheless note that fraud can bias 
promotion and awards only if it is massive: one is unlikely to receive an award for one fraudulent 
paper in a low-profile journal.) 
Other practices  that are often frowned upon are redundant publications,  ‘self-plagiarism,’  and 
‘salami  slicing’  (i.e. publishing  many  papers  where  one  would  have  been  enough),  as  well  as 
unwarranted (‘honorary’)  authorship.  Another problem relative to publications  is  when reviewers 
stall the review of an article (by not replying to the editors in a timely manner or by asking for extra 
work that will take time and delay publication) so that their own paper on the subject will come out 
first. The main issue is, as with plagiarism, that one may receive undeserved rewards. 
Certain results may be obtained from human subjects who had not consented to being part of an 
experiment or from animals that were mistreated in the process. One should note that mistreating 
subjects does not affect the truthfulness of the research and of publications, neither does it harm the 
population at large or waste money. As Chris  Kaposy (2008) notes: “Of course, accurate objective 
scientific results can be derived from experiments that pay no heed to patient safety or other ethical 
issues.  It  is  not  a  necessary  truth  that  objective  knowledge  must  be  produced  ethically.” 
Mistreatments, mishandling of hazardous materials and similar issues are simply a separate question 
and one must argue against it using specific arguments. 
C. Side effects 
After looking at whether arguments against scientific misconduct justify banning certain practices, 
I now turn to the question of whether they make collateral damages, e.g. whether they make wrong 
things that are generally not so considered. Table I provides a summary. 
An important issue is whether false results coming from an intent to deceive are to be treated 
differently from those that are due to involuntary errors, carelessness or chance. Honest errors do 
not mean that the scientist was not honestly seeking truth, but they do adversely affect scientific 
records, waste funds, and they may harm the population or get someone undeserved rewards. In 
other words, most arguments should hold honest errors to be as wrong as fabrication or falsification. 
Honest errors may in fact be more problematic, simply because they are far more common than 
voluntary  deception  (Bouville, 2008b) —  science  is  hurt  more  by  “sloppy  or  careless  research 
practices  and apathy than by incidents  of  research fraud or  other serious scientific  misconduct” 
4 Nature (2006)  laments  that  some countries  “offer  scientists  cash  prizes  for  publications  in  top-level 
international journals” because “a researcher measuring science in terms of dollars might be more tempted to 
plagiarize or fabricate data.” (One may notice that the same is true of someone measuring science in terms of 
publication in Nature.) Since the main effect of plagiarism is undeserved rewards —fame, money—, one may 
wonder  why  plagiarism is wrong  if  seeking  fame or  money is  wrong,  i.e. if  the  victims are  deprived  of 
something that they should not want anyway. In fact greed and vanity are taken into account to manage 
researchers through promotion and awards: someone absolutely free from such vices would be absolutely 
unmanageable. Russian mathematician Grigori Perelman declined a Fields medal (the ‘Nobel prize for math’) 
in 2006, saying that it “was completely irrelevant for [him]. Everybody understood that if the proof is correct 
then no other recognition is needed.” Strangely, he was not praised for his utter absence of vanity and his 
unalloyed search for knowledge.
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(Institute of Medicine, 1989, p. 21). One should note that any error can have negative consequences: 
not only the intentional, not even only the reckless or the negligent: even an error made in spite of 
extraordinary caution can damage the scientific record, waste money, hurt the population, and garner 
undeserved rewards.  Prosecuting the unlucky is then as justified as prosecuting the dishonest — 
surprisingly,  this  straightforward  and  important  conclusion  is  seldom  reached.  It  is  commonly 
claimed that cheaters cannot be trusted, and “the institution of science involves an implicit social 
contract between scientists that each can depend on the trustworthiness of the rest” (Zuckerman, 
1977, p. 113). But, one could just as much say that someone who is incompetent or careless cannot 
be trusted because future results may be tainted by these flaws. Both technical incompetence and 
dishonesty can break trust. Moreover, loss of trust is to some extent self-fulfilling (Bouville, 2008b): 
one loses trust because one believes that fraud can lead to loss of trust. 
The harm to the population argument applies essentially to medical research (fake cosmology data 
will not harm anyone, for instance), so it cannot be used against research misconduct in general — it 
would mean that some fields would be necessarily devoid of misconduct. One should also note that 
one study should not be able to cause much harm, since something that may cause much harm 
should receive much attention (verification, repetition), so that a work that can single-handedly cause 
much harm can do so only through the actions or inaction of others  (i.e. this  cannot be single-
handed). 
In some cases the wrongness of fraud does not justify trying to reduce it. This is obvious in the 
case of the wasting of funding: investigation and prosecution of fraud can be more costly than fraud 
itself. These trade-offs will be more fully addressed in the next section. 
A last  point  is  that  if  something  is  wrong because it  has certain negative  consequences then 
anything with the same consequences (within or without science) is wrong. A government cutting 
health care budgets does more harm to public health than all scientific fraud combined. Likewise, 
scientific misconduct is a tiny source of loss of public funding: if efficient use of public funds is really 
the issue then one should look at billions rather than at spare change. The war on Iraq has cost the 
U.S. trillions of dollars (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008) and not even the most faithful believer can deny 
that there have been many mistakes, costing billions of dollars and many human lives. If one really 
means  to  save  public  funds  then  what  really  wastes  them should  be  the  priority,  not  scientific 
misconduct. One should also bear in mind that research is intrinsically a very wasteful and inefficient 
activity: success is always preceded by many shots in the dark and many failures — misconduct is just 
a drop in this ocean. 
D. The ground of the arguments 
The five arguments of scientific  record, honesty,  waste of funds, harm to the population and 
undeserved rewards mostly fail to support current policies on research fraud: they may not prove 
wrong what is typically considered research misconduct and they tend to make wrong things that are 
not usually seen as scientific fraud, such as honest errors. But one must also ask whether we should 
give any weight to these arguments at all. 
While it is plain that science is a social activity, arguments such as waste of money and undeserved 
rewards  go  one  step  further  by  construing  science  as  just  an  expense  or  a  source  of  social 
recognition.  An obvious  problem is  that  this  makes science  an occupation similar  to any other, 
without  much  special  to  it:  science  is  just  a  job.  (One  may  remark  that  the  concept  of 
disinterestedness  introduced  by  Robert  Merton (1942)  was  meant  for  researchers  qua  scientists, 
whereas  nowadays  they  are  rather  treated  qua  employees:  ‘publish  or  perish’  is  a  matter  of 
management, not of science.) Furthermore, this would make scientific fraud not a matter of science 
but rather a financial or managerial issue — but then why should scientists care about it at all? 
The question of honesty is not self-evident either. First, how does one know that fraud actually 
springs from dishonesty (Bouville, 2007c)? Friedman (1992) pointed out the lack of “study that gets 
inside the mind of the perpetrators to discover what,  if  anything,  they were thinking when they 
committed fraud” (the only such work is that of  Davis  et   al.  , 2007) and Forsman (1999) argued that 
“in protecting research integrity, we have to face the real human psychology.” Another point is that 
if  one holds  that  honesty  is  necessary  to reach the  truth then it  is  just  a  means (i.e. honesty  is 
necessary inasmuch as one cannot generate knowledge without it), but this is just another version of 
the  scientific  record  argument  rather  than  a  separate  viewpoint.  One  may  alternatively  say  that 
honesty is required for its own sake, but this requires justification. 
E. Examples 
After  looking  at  which  acts  are  wrong  according  to  various  arguments  against  research 
misconduct,  I  will  now consider  a  number  of  scientists  and compare  them based  on the  same 
arguments. Table II gives a summary. 
Author A copied an article verbatim and published it in a marginal journal, where nobody read it. 
Author B is both honest and careful but nevertheless made an error and thus published results that 
mistakenly hold a certain drug (now used by millions) to be harmless; this work made B famous. 
Unlike A, B published results that are false, wasted money, harmed people and garnered undeserved 
rewards. A is guilty of scientific misconduct. 
Author C did not feel like doing actual work and simply made stuff up, the ensuing article had no 
impact. The research of D failed to generate any result, so D did not publish anything. Neither C nor 
D harmed anyone or received unmerited distinctions; D wasted money while C did not. C is guilty of 
scientific misconduct. 
One can also compare researchers B and D. Neither was dishonest but both wasted funds, and 
scientist B  published  invalid  results,  harmed  the  population,  and  received  undeserved  rewards. 
Neither researcher would be considered guilty of scientific misconduct. 
E  is  the  serious  researcher  next  door:  E’s  articles  are  honest,  essentially  error-free  and  of 
moderate interest. F copied a fairly recent paper that went unnoticed in spite of its great merits; these 
merits were finally recognized (and attributed to F) and led to very promising new developments. 
Neither E nor F published false data, only F’s article was of great benefit  to science and to the 
population at large (and at absolutely no cost). Arguably, F should be rewarded for furthering the 
goals of science. F is guilty of scientific misconduct. 
Author  G  (who  is  not  a  native  speaker  of  English)  oftentimes  copies  paragraphs  from the 
background  and  method  sections  of  other  people’s  articles  in  order  to  ensure  clarity  of  these 
descriptions (the methods themselves are well-established); G’s results are genuine and they have had 
very beneficial outcomes. G is not trying to steal from others but simply to improve the clarity of his 
articles (see Bouville, 2008b).  The  few  paragraphs  G  copied  cost  no  money,  garnered  no 
unwarranted reward, and did not affect the scientific record. G’s research had positive consequences 
for the population. G is guilty of scientific misconduct. 
One can also compare public relation (PR) plagiarist F to non-native speaker G. Neither scientist 
wasted funds, published invalid results, or harmed the population. F was dishonest but not G. Both 
researchers would be considered guilty of scientific misconduct. 
H gave an untested drug to patients without their consent; it turns out that this medicine did not 
harm them and is even the only known cure to a certain disease. The only difference between E and 
H is that H’s research was greatly beneficial to the population, unlike that of E. H’s behavior would 
be considered wrong (but H may not be prosecuted). 
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There is a dramatic difference between current policies and the outcomes of the usual arguments 
against fraud, as can be seen in Table II — no single argument against research misconduct seems to 
capture the many aspects (positive and negative) of the behaviors of these scientists and of their 
consequences (and neither do policies): they may discriminate between researchers that exhibit no 
major difference, and they may even punish the one who benefited science or the whole of society. 
III. SANCTIONS 
A. The purpose of sanctions (if any)
As Philip Ball (2008) points out, “austere calls for penalizing scientific misconduct rarely indicate 
what such penalties are meant to achieve”, because “discussions of scientific misconduct seem all too 
often to stop at the primitive notion that it is a bad thing.” For instance, “the South Korean national 
committee on bioethics rejected an application by Hwang Woo-suk to resume research on stem cells. 
Why? Because ‘he engaged in unethical and wrongful acts in the past’, according to one source.” Ball 
wonders: “Does the committee fear that Hwang would do it again, despite the intense scrutiny that 
would be given to his  every move? Do they think he hasn’t  been sufficiently  punished yet? Or 
perhaps  that  approval  would  have  raised  doubts  about  the  rigour  of  the  country’s  bioethics 
procedures?”
It is not clear that sanctions have a goal and that those deciding them would be able to justify 
punishment beyond saying that the scientist did something wrong. Bernard Williams (1985, p. 177) 
noted that  “blame is  the characteristic  reaction of the morality  system” and Friedrich  Nietzsche 
(1888) that “wherever responsibilities are sought, it is usually the instinct of wanting to judge and 
punish which is at work.” The First World Conference on Research Integrity held in September 2007 
in  Portugal  used  the  picture  of  a  hand-cuffed  Erlenmeyer  flask  as  a  logo  of  sorts  (see 
http://tinyurl.com/2odvre). Barbara Redman and Arthur Caplan (2005) entitled their article “Off 
with their heads!”. Birgitta  Forsman (1999), who believes that “the most important thing is not to 
punish scientists who have done something wrong,” must feel lonely. Punishing fraudsters seems so 
natural to so many that no one seems to notice that punishment always needs justification — “The 
moral problem that the having of a legal institution of punishment presents can be stated in one 
sentence: It involves the deliberate and intentional infliction of suffering” (Burgh, 1982).
B. Consistency and relevance of sanctions 
Since sanctions are the main concern, discussions revolve around what is prosecutable rather than 
around what is wrong. It may be impossible to prove intent but possible to show that someone’s 
actions were at least reckless. Punishing recklessness may then be used as a tactic to punish those 
who intended to deceive but could not be proven so — “because proving intent is very difficult, the 
addition  of  ‘committed…in  reckless  disregard  of  accepted  practices’  was  identified  as  an 
improvement in the policy” (Bird and Dustira, 2000). But the fact that intent is hard to prove does 
not entail that one should include reckless errors along with intentional ones. One should prosecute 
people because they did something wrong, not because it is easy to prosecute them. Recklessness 
should be treated as wrong only if it is wrong (and if it is believed to be wrong, one must provide 
arguments  in  this  sense).  What  kind  of  justice  does  one  get  when  one  prosecutes  based  on 
convenience rather than based on wrongness? 
Just like a given argument against scientific misconduct can make certain behaviors wrong but not 
others,  it  can  justify  certain  kinds  of  sanctions  but  not  others.  One  may  wonder  why  funding 
agencies should debar a plagiarist from funding, since plagiarism does not waste their money, it does 
not affect the creation of new knowledge, and it has no adverse effect on the population at large — 
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put colloquially: it’s none of their business. If a plagiarist received an undeserved promotion or if an 
award was obtained for fabricated data, these may be rescinded. But if the plagiarist would have been 
promoted  anyway  (e.g.  his  other  work  would  justify  promotion)  then,  in  order  to  cancel  the 
promotion —let alone fire the researcher or rescind his PhD (Nature, 2004)—, one must claim that 
plagiarism is intrinsically wrong and that plagiarists should be sanctioned in any case, i.e. one must 
invoke  an  argument  other  than  that  of  undeserved  promotion.  If  the  argument  is  ‘without  the 
fraudulent articles they would not have been promoted’ then the promotion can be canceled (based 
on this argument) only if it is true that they would not have been promoted in the absence of the 
fraudulent papers. 
C. Consequences and fairness of sanctions 
What is the concrete effect of a one-year debarment from funding? None for someone about to 
take a sabbatical leave, who has retired, or a then-graduate student who no longer does research — 
the impact of the sanction will  depend greatly  on the specific  situation of the researcher, i.e. on 
things utterly irrelevant to what the scientist did wrong. Also, consequences are not proportional to 
the length of the debarment: someone without funding for five years must find a new occupation; in 
such a case the end of the sanction is purely theoretical. One, three, five years cannot be treated just 
as numbers: they have particular effects on scientists, and it is these consequences of the sanctions 
rather than the length of the debarment that should be proportional to the wrongness of what the 
researcher did. However, the only available study (Redman and Merz, 2008) does not have this level 
of detail and the U.S. Office of Research Integrity [ORI] does not know the concrete consequences 
of fund debarment of various lengths (ORI, private communication). In other words, no one knows 
whether the harshness of the actual punishment depends on the wrongness of the deed.
Certain consequences of a condemnation can randomly increase the sanction. As Babbage (1830) 
notes,  “that  part  of  the  scientific  world  whose  opinion  is  of  most  weight,  is  generally  so 
unreasonable, as to neglect altogether the observations of those in whom they have, on any occasion, 
discovered traces of the artist” — if guilt is proven for one article it is assumed for all others (also 
see Nature, 2004). Moreover, each time someone writes on the subject of scientific fraud, decade-old 
deeds are once more associated with the name of a researcher so that “the potential negative impact 
on reputation [is] perpetuated (and hence punishment extended)” even though one could think that 
“someone who has made a mistake should be allowed the opportunity to rehabilitate his or her 
reputation” (Bird, 2004). (Not to mention the largely publicized ‘Baltimore case,’ thus named because 
David Baltimore was not the one accused.) 
D. On sanctioning negligence 
Warren Schmaus (1983) takes negligence to be wrong because it springs from a failure to follow 
proper research procedures, in particular it is a lack of scrutiny of one’s own work. The negligent 
researcher is not aware of the potential error (but should have been), whereas the reckless is aware of 
it and fails to act upon this knowledge. A practical problem is that identification of negligence will be 
influenced by hindsight bias. Indeed, when an error is uncovered, everyone will claim in retrospect that 
obviously the scientist should have spotted it — similar to sport fans who always know after the 
match  what  tactic  to  use.  There  are  hundreds  of  things  which  may  go  wrong  (and  which  the 
researcher is expected to prevent) but when it is known exactly what went wrong, this one thing 
tends to leap to the top of the list of what should have been tested. Negligence is thus likely to be 
overdiagnosed.  And,  contrary  to  the  difficulty  to  show  an  intention  to  deceive,  this  artifact  is 
naturally against the defendant, i.e. against presumption of innocence. 
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On the bright side, negligent errors are easily avoided: all one needs to do is check for possible 
artifacts and contaminations, repeat the experiments many times, etc. — all  this takes is time and 
money, which are both plentiful. Naturally if one spends more time and money checking results, one 
spends less generating new findings. Whether having fewer, more reliable results is better than more 
numerous  but  less  reliable  results  is  an  open  question.  The  ideal  situation  is  probably  enough 
verification to weed out the most egregious errors but not so much as to do nothing but check 
results. In other words, it is good that some results are invalid. (Thermodynamics tells us that a state 
devoid of defect is seldom the most favorable: entropy should be reduced only inasmuch as this 
decreases free energy.) Science would not fare better if all negligent work were sanctioned, since it 
would force researchers to dedicate far more resources to checking results. If any error that I could 
have detected can lead to loss of funding, infamy, and so on, I will indeed be more careful. Actually, 
I will  be careful to the point of meaninglessness. (And I could be accused of wasting money on 
unnecessary tests.)  Creativity,  uncertainty,  and even errors are part of scientific  research and any 
attempt to get rid of every error would obviously put an end to any scientific endeavor. 
In fact, we may not need the same level of accuracy for all results. If I publish data that turn out 
to be of no interest to anyone then whether they are valid or not is rather unimportant — an error 
would affect a volume of the scientific record that no one ever browses anyway. If, on the other 
hand, my results attract lots of interest, many people will try to reproduce them, so one will soon 
find out about possible errors. The most scrupulous verifications should be saved for results that 
deserve them. This would be a more efficient use of time and money than painstakingly checking all 
results.  A  process  that  would  attempt  to  remove  every  error  at  every  stage  would  be  highly 
inefficient. 
E. When fighting fraud is worse than fraud 
Fighting fraud may have negative effects similar to those of fraud itself. If fraud is wrong because 
it  wastes money then fighting it  makes sense only if  this saves money. If  hiring new specialized 
employees instead of new postdocs and spending less time on research and more on paperwork 
costs more than fraud then fighting fraud is a waste of public money and should be fought. If fraud 
were actually a financial issue, then one would make sure that fighting fraud be not more costly than 
fraud itself.  Firms have quality  controls  because very low quality  costs  them money and is  bad 
publicity but, since overquality could cost more money than low quality, a reasonable trade-off is 
sought. 
Similarly,  the  obsession  with  fraud may hinder  science  even more than fraud itself.  Kenneth 
Pimple (1999) does not “fear that ORI (as it is currently constituted) will intentionally hamper science, 
but [he] know[s] that bureaucracies always cause trouble, even when they do not mean to.” Dooley 
and Kerch (2000) note that “most researchers in the physical sciences are likely subject to a policy on 
scientific  misconduct  but  are  unaware  of  what  would  actually  happen  if  they  were  accused  of 
misconduct.” Physicists should feel concerned only if they are likely to exclaim ‘Someone must have 
been telling lies about me, I have done nothing wrong but, one morning, I was arrested.’ If this is 
unlikely to occur then awareness is unneeded. And if this is a likely event where you live, learning 
about potential  consequences of accusations of  misconduct is  not the answer:  exile  is.  Sovacool 
(2005)  wants  to  “penalize  those  who  know  of  misconduct  within  their  institution,  harshening 
criminal statutes could motivate more colleagues to report violations” and notes that “criminalizing 
misconduct could also motivate scientists to be more careful in their research.” In fact it would most 
likely “transform science so that … well, so that it isn’t fun any more” (Pimple, 1999). It would not 
motivate scientists but rather disgust them and incite them to find a different occupation. Orwellian 
science is an oxymoron, and should remain so. 
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One should remark that if certain talented researchers are banished from science then science may 
suffer a great loss (also see Ball, 2008). If Einstein had been found guilty of some misdemeanor in his 
youth, would it have been a good idea to prevent him from doing science any longer? It seems that 
the harm to science would have been incommensurably greater than would have been the lack of a 
punishment. A scientist who would publish great work alternating with fraud would still contribute 
far more to science than someone publishing honest but infinitely uninteresting work.
IV. CONCLUSION: FRAUD, FROM MORALITY TO SCIENCE 
Zuckerman (1984)  notes  that  negligent  researchers  are  treated  “with  derision  and contempt” 
whereas “scientists respond to [fraud] with all  the sting of moral indignation, denouncing it  as a 
crime and labeling perpetrators as charlatans and scoundrels.” In other words: in science, morality is 
far more important than science itself. A corollary is that for something to be important it has to be 
contrived as a moral requirement. One can thus find a purely technical recommendation such as 
“Act with skill and care in all scientific work. Maintain up to date skills and assist their development 
in others.” as part of a proposed “universal ethical  code for scientists” (Council  for Science and 
Technology, 2005).  Kaposy (2008) notes that “According to these codes of ethics, it is an ethical 
duty to be skillful and rigorous in pursuit of the truth — it is an ethical duty to do the science well.” 
Hofmann (2007) claims that “moral norms are not only needed to regulate science, they define it”, 
and  Schmaus (1983)  takes  moral  concerns  to  have  a  special  power  when  he  focuses  on  “a 
professional function upon which society places a high moral value”, and since knowledge is not a 
“high moral value” (as it is not a moral value at all) it is dismissed as unimportant. Seeking the truth 
is  presented as  a  matter  of  morality  —as honesty— instead of  being  related to knowledge  and 
understanding, i.e. the core purposes of science. It is somehow taken for granted that if seeking the 
truth  were  just  a  scientific  matter  it  would  be  negligible,  but  as  an ethical  issue  it  becomes all 
important (also see Bouville, 2007b). An obvious consequence is that the more one looks at science 
and knowledge from a moral viewpoint, the more one belittles them by denying them any intrinsic 
value.
In fact, the difference between fabricating results and obtaining false data by error is not that the 
former is immoral. Rather the difference is that fabricating data is not science whereas involuntary 
errors are part of science (perhaps not the most commendable part, but science nonetheless). There 
is no need to import external criteria: science comes with its own. What is scientific is the most 
natural and best criterion. This has some notable consequences. (i) If it is established that some work 
is not scientific then withdrawing the article is quite natural. However, this concerns only the work 
not its author: there is a leap between saying that the work is not scientific and saying anything about 
the author, e.g. that he is not a real scientist. While not being scientific seems the most natural way of 
rejecting certain works, it is not the criterion that most straightforwardly leads to punishment (which 
may explain why it is seldom mentioned). (ii) Let us consider the case of a researcher who faked 
results  in  one  paper  but  who  otherwise  published  genuine  scientific  work.  Most  people  would 
consider that this researcher should be deprived of funding and may even be dismissed. Now let us 
consider a scientist who also writes on subjects such as parapsychology or astrology. Again part of 
his publications would not be scientific. Would one think of depriving him from funding or even of 
his job? (iii) What if a physicist who has been caught fabricating data claims that it is not fraud but 
really  an  attempt  to  deconstruct  the  status  quo  of  the  bourgeois  patriarchy?  Naturally,  other 
physicists would reject this as non-sense. Broader institutions, on the other hand, may be in trouble: 
can universities employ (and public money fund) people who aim at doing just this while fighting 
fraud? Also, honestly seeking knowledge is not universally seen as a goal;  some research may be 
censored  because  some  do  not  want  to  know  the  answer  to  certain  questions  (e.g. Ceci 
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et   al.  , 1985) — convenient beliefs may be preferred to inconvenient knowledge. Naturally, all this is 
problematic for institutions, not for scientists. Scientists need only realize that there is no reason to 
allow the issue of fraud to be treated as a bureaucratic or a moral matter. Zuckerman (1984) noted 
that “scientists respond to [fraud] with all the sting of moral indignation” — in fact this indignation 
should be of a different kind, a scientific one. 
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TABLE I Which acts are wrong according to current policies and to various arguments against research misconduct. In bold are cases 
conflicting with current policies. *: these are held to be wrong but may not be prosecuted as ‘scientific misconduct’ (rules may vary by 











construes science as — knowledge moral financial serviceable managed
fabrication yes† yes yes some† some some
falsification yes† yes yes some† some some
plagiarism yes no mildly no no some
redundant publication yes* no no no no some
‘honorary’ authorship yes* no no no no some
stalling reviews yes* no mildly no no some
mistreatments yes* no no no no no
honest errors no yes no yes some some
all fields yes yes yes yes no yes
trade-off — yes no yes yes no
outside science — no no yes yes no
TABLE II Which researcher did the worse thing according to current policies and to various arguments against research misconduct. In bold 
are cases conflicting with current policies. ‘Neither’ and ‘both’ respectively mean that neither researcher and both researchers did something 
wrong. *: mistreatment of human subjects is held to be wrong but may not be prosecuted as ‘scientific misconduct’ (rules may vary by 











A (plagiarist) vs. B (unlucky hecatomb) A B A B B B
C (lazy fabricator) vs. D (unsuccessful) C C C D neither neither
B (unlucky hecatomb) vs. D (unsuccessful) neither B neither both B B
E (average) vs. F (PR plagiarist) F E† F E† E† arguable
E (average) vs. G (non-native speaker) G neither neither neither E† neither
F (PR plagiarist) vs. G (non-native speaker) both neither F neither neither arguable
E (average) vs. H (no consent) H* neither neither neither E† neither
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